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Review Essay
North Korea and Failed Diplomacy
LARRY M. WORTZEL

T

hree of the books in this review essay share in common their view of an “Axis
of Evil” in American foreign policy under the George W. Bush Administration.
This “Axis” is what authors Charles Pritchard, Jacques Fuqua, and Mike Chinoy describe as the “hard-liners” in the Bush Administration; a cabal led by then-Vice President Richard Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Assistant Secretary of
State John Bolton. The three authors accuse these hard-liners of derailing any nuclear
disarmament agreement with North Korea. They share the view that with continued,
patient engagement the “Agreed Framework” with North Korea could have been salvaged, despite the highly enriched uranium program that was to replace the North’s
plutonium nuclear weapons program.
In The Peninsula Question Yoichi Funabashi provides a more nuanced perspective, identifying a well-networked group of “neoconservatives” in the Bush Administration who were skeptical that any deal could be reached with North Korea. The
author also provides a rich discussion of the perspective of Japan’s politicians on North
Korea and explains Japan’s interests in the outcome.
Bruce Bechtol’s Red Rogue provides an objective, well-argued, and balanced
discussion that is well-documented. He is pessimistic about the future, but his writing
is free of ideological or political bias. His book also has the advantage of providing a
solid explanation of how the conventional military threat from North Korea against the
South affects the nuclear issue. From Bechtol’s perspective, “precedent suggests the
North Koreans will simply pursue an alternate path to nuclear weaponization” regardless of the interim agreements that may be reached. The author’s assessment is that
Pyongyang will cheat or stall, regardless of the incentives that are offered.
This reviewer will attempt to assess and comment on these books based on
a perspective developed during two tours of duty as a military attaché in China. This
experience, and subsequent visits to China, provided a host of opportunities to solicit
the views of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior leaders regarding the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Chinese and American interests
on the Korean Peninsula.
As the 1994 “Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” neared its first crisis, officials from the Clinton
Administration traveled to China seeking counsel, to convey American frustration, and
to attempt to meet with North Korean officials. In the senior ranks of China’s leadership, many feared war might explode, while at the same time it appeared that economic
conditions in the North might bring about a collapse of Kim Jong-il’s regime.
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In 1995 and 1996, as American politicians tried to deal with the North Korean
nuclear program, some of the most senior officers in the PLA made it clear that neither
the United States, nor its ally South Korea, should attempt to inject military forces over
the 38th parallel, either to stabilize a collapse in North Korea or to attack suspected
nuclear sites.
While the Clinton Administration debated whether to conduct air strikes on
suspected nuclear sites in North Korea, several PLA officials at the highest echelons
of the Defense Ministry and the PLA’s General Staff Department stated, “China will
not let North Korea collapse.” Unlike their American counterparts, senior PLA intelligence officers did not agree that if North Korea had nuclear weapons it necessarily
created a crisis. These PLA officers suggested that as early as 1995 Kim Jong-il had
two to three plutonium-based nuclear devices, but that American nuclear superiority
and extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea was sufficient to maintain peace on
the Peninsula. In other words, the PLA was not concerned that North Korea was armed
with nuclear weapons then, and they believed that the United States should continue a
policy of patient engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
With respect to contingency missions on the Korean Peninsula, one of the
most senior Chinese military leaders with whom this reviewer had contact said in
1996 that “if the leaders in the United States think the US military or its ally South
Korea can simply march north in the event of a collapse in North Korea without some
consultation with the PLA, it will look like 1950 all over again.” He emphasized that
this position should be reported accurately to the US government and that China had
its own vital security interests and commitments in North Korea, which he expected
the US leadership to consider and consult on before acting. These are critical points
because they affect how far the United States and its allies could then go (and can go
now) in pursuing sanctions related to the Six-Party Talks, as well as how to craft any
response to crises on the Korean Peninsula.
The bottom-line from the perspective of this reviewer is that there are limits to
what the United States and its allies can do unless they want a complete break with or
to invite conflict with China. At the same time, no matter what sanctions are imposed
on Pyongyang, the Chinese leadership is firm that they will take measures to forestall
any collapse of the North Korean regime, which ultimately would make such sanctions
less effective.
Given this perspective, the most realistic of the books discussed in this review
essay is Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea, by Bruce Bechtol, Jr.
Bechtol is the only author who seems to consider that it may be impossible to create
circumstances where North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons program because of external support (from China and Russia). Yoichi Funabashi, in The Peninsula
Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, comes to much the same
conclusion. Both authors are realists, and Funabashi’s work provides an important
explanation of how the kidnappings of Japanese citizens by the North Koreans affect
domestic politics as Tokyo takes part in the Six-Party Talks as well as its own bilateral
discussions with the DPRK.
The author of Failed Diplomacy is Charles “Jack” Pritchard, a very experienced
Asia hand. He is a retired Army colonel, a Foreign Area Officer, and was US Army attaché in Tokyo. Pritchard served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Clinton
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Administration and then on the National Security Council (NSC). In the Clinton Administration, Pritchard spent five years as senior director of Asian affairs on the NSC
and became senior director for Asia. When President Bush took office, Pritchard was
asked to fill the position of US representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization at the Department of State, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. By that time he had retired from the Army after
28 years of service, but he was well-known to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy
Secretary Richard Armitage, and his direct boss, Assistant Secretary James Kelly.
Parts of Pritchard’s narrative, however, are sadly almost naïve. He seems to
believe that after serving in political positions for several years, he could just move
over into an appointed position in another administration and have the trust of people
ideologically committed to different policies and politics. These are some of the hardliners that catch most of Pritchard’s ire in his book.
Not all of these hard-liners are neoconservatives. In that sense Yoichi Funabashi
also mischaracterizes some of the Bush appointees who were skeptical of any deal
with North Korea. All of the people who frustrated Pritchard (as well as Powell, Armitage, and Kelly), however, did not trust Kim Jong-il, were convinced that North Korea
would cheat on any agreement it made, and believed that the Clinton Administration
had cut bad deals in all of its negotiations with North Korea.
Authors Pritchard, Fuqua, and Chinoy all point to roughly the same group of
people as undermining any efforts toward a deal with Pyongyang. These include: thenVice President Cheney; Cheney’s chief of staff, “Scooter” Libby; Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; Under Secretary of Defense
Doug Feith; Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton; State Department staff appointee
Mark Groombridge; Robert Joseph, the senior director for counterproliferation on the
NSC; Erik Edleman in the Office of the Vice President; and Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch. The three authors describe classic bureaucratic infighting throughout the interagency process between these committed skeptics of North Korea (and
Clinton policies) and other moderate or pragmatic diplomats and political appointees
in the Bush Administration.
Failed Diplomacy is a good read because of the detail and personal observations Pritchard injects regarding his North Korean interlocutors. He is critical of President Bush for the handling of then-South Korean President Kim Dae-Jong (insulting
Kim by referring to him as “this man”), but does not discuss the policy errors Kim
Dae-Jong made when assuming office in attempts to push a conciliatory agenda toward
North Korea even before meeting President Bush. Pritchard is also correct in his criticism of the manner in which the President made disparaging remarks to the press about
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Public insults in the international press are not the
way to begin a diplomatic dialogue.
Part of the reason for Pritchard’s discomfort is that he was a political holdover.
It is hard to accept a political appointment and function effectively when you are not one
of the activists and partisan political workers who helped frame a party’s platform and
the President’s policies throughout the campaign and assumption of office. There are
limits to how much trust a committed political team will place in outsiders. That may
be a lesson for the Obama Administration and for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a
holdover who will undoubtedly keep some of his Bush team while he is in office.
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Pritchard misses the mark, however, on whether the negotiations could have
succeeded had the hard-liners not frustrated any efforts at a resolution. If the Chinese
Communist Party leadership was always going to act as the “safety valve” to ensure
that things would not get too tough in Pyongyang, why would Kim Jong-il need to live
up to his agreements? Pritchard lays a lot of the blame on the Bush Administration for
North Korea getting the bomb, as his subtitle indicates.
This reviewer thinks Pritchard is wrong. The real tragic story of how North
Korea got not one, but two kinds of bombs is not because of Bush (or Clinton) administration policies, but because of Pakistan’s and China’s complicity. Bruce Bechtol
covers that process well.
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., retired from the Marine Corps and went on to teach international relations at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He is a former
intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency and has experience working
and teaching in South Korea. He holds a doctorate in national security studies from
the Union Institute in Cincinnati, Ohio. In Red Rogue Bechtol asserts there is plenty
of evidence available to policy professionals, without resorting to classified information, to confirm North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. Further, he
argues, Pyongyang pursued the HEU program because the agreement to freeze the
plutonium program in the 1994 “Agreed Framework” and to submit to International
Atomic Energy Agency oversight meant that Kim Jong-il needed an alternate nuclear
weapons program. Bechtol blames Pakistan, the A. Q. Khan black-market nuclear supply ring that operated out of Pakistan, and Chinese complicity for North Korea getting
these bombs.
If the Chinese intelligence officers with whom this reviewer interacted in 1995
are correct, North Korea had three to five nuclear weapons then and has added to them.
Bechtol thinks they also have HEU weapons. He cites a number of sources to support
this, including Hwang Jong-Yop, a defector from the DPRK; testimony by Bob Gallucci,
the former Clinton Administration negotiator; and former Defense Intelligence Agency
Director Lowell Jacoby’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Bechtol’s Red Rogue is well-written and argued in a balanced tone. The reader does not come away feeling that the author had an ideological or personal axe to
grind. The treatment is pragmatic and full of historical detail. It also has a very useful
discussion of North Korea’s conventional military threat against South Korea, which
gives the entire issue some context. One goal of Bush Administration policies was to
address both the conventional and the nuclear threats. Bechtol offers a short but excellent discussion of Chinese and Russian interests in maintaining the status quo on the
Peninsula. Policymakers in both China and Russia have no interest in a North Korean
collapse. Bechtol argues that China and Russia are comfortable with Cold War-like
nuclear deterrence calculations and think that the likelihood of nuclear conflict is low.
They think American deterrence and extended deterrence are adequate to keep the
Peninsula stable. This analysis is very close to that of experts on Korea the reviewer
has talked to in China.
Jacques L. Fuqua is another retired military officer. He was a Northeast Asia
Foreign Area Officer in the Army and retired as a lieutenant colonel after 21 years of
service. He went on to run international programs at the University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign. In Nuclear Endgame, the author is quite critical of Bush Administration
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policies, arguing that the whole concept of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program (the Bush “CVID” formula) might be
a decent policy goal for an end-state on the Korean Peninsula, but it is not a strategy
for achieving that goal.
Fuqua instead offers four premises that he thinks should be the foundation
of any strategy for dealing with North Korea. First, the nuclear issue should not be
a standalone approach but must be part of a comprehensive approach to security and
economic well-being on the Korean Peninsula. Second, any formula must offer economic benefits to North Korea to succeed; it cannot be an approach that relies solely on
isolation and sanctions. Third, and this is really the crux of Fuqua’s thesis, negotiators
should understand the ideological underpinnings of North Korea’s Communist Party
and its history. Finally, he argues that constructive engagement with North Korea does
not mean capitulation in the negotiation; therefore, despite negative circumstances, the
United States needs to remain engaged.
Where has Fuqua been for the past 15 years or so? The United States began
serious discussions with North Korea to address conventional security, economic wellbeing, and eventually the nuclear program in Poland in approximately 1988. Then,
for another five years, American and North Korean diplomats met in Beijing and at
the United Nations until the “Agreed Framework” was reached. All that time, there
were military-to-military discussions going on to decide how to locate the remains of
missing personnel from the Korean War. These were comprehensive approaches to
problems, and they involved economic aid to North Korea.
Another facet of Fuqua’s logic is his advocacy for “asymmetric economic
statecraft.” This was the approach that the People’s Republic of China suggested to US
negotiators after the 1995 nuclear crisis. The idea was that the United States and other
parties to the “Agreed Framework” would continue to supply fuel oil and economic
assistance to North Korea as good will, with the idea that at some time in the future
Pyongyang would reciprocate and end its security threats. Well, we have been there
and done that. Fuqua also suggests that the West find a way to develop a market system and economic liberalization in North Korea. After all, Kim Dae-Jong’s “Sunshine
Policy” was a failed experiment in “asymmetric economic statecraft.”
Another suggestion from the author is that just as the failure of the Soviet
Union led to the unification of Germany, then only the end of China’s support to North
Korea can lead to reunification on the Korean Peninsula. This reviewer’s recollection
is that bankers and industrialists in South Korea were appalled at the cost of German
reunification and preferred to keep separate while helping a viable economy to develop
in the North. They did not want to foot the bill for reunification. Also, the Chinese
Communist Party was in no hurry to abandon its support for North Korea and is not
willing to do so today.
Do not spend the $49.95 to buy Nuclear Endgame. The publisher, the Greenwood Press subsidiary Praeger Security International, has got to find a way to publish
more affordable books. If you want to read about Fuqua’s personal interpretation of the
North Korean concept of Juche, which he translates as “independence of action,” get
the book out of the library. This may be the only part of the book worth the money.
Yoichi Funabashi is an experienced Japanese journalist and editor-in-chief of
the Asahi Shimbun in Tokyo. This newspaper has a liberal editorial line and works very

102

Parameters

hard to present objective, balanced articles that present both sides of any policy debate.
Also, Funabashi is a strong “America watcher” who has written for the United States
Institute of Peace and the Council on Foreign Relations in addition to being a distinguished guest scholar at the Brookings Institution. He takes a balanced approach in
The Peninsula Question, an excellent, richly documented book. Funabashi interviewed
all the principals from every participating nation in the Six-Party Talks and hundreds
of other sources, although he does not name his North Korean interlocutors.
The Peninsula Question provides a superb explanation of the Japanese perspective on North Korea and Korean Peninsula security. For those who are not familiar
with the actions of North Korea in forcibly abducting a number of Japan’s citizens in
the 1970s and 1980s, Funabashi’s account is mandatory reading. He opens the book
with a dramatic account of the internal debate among Japan’s diplomats and politicians
who accompanied Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on his September 2002 meeting with Kim Jong-il. The account by Funabashi makes it clear that Koizumi closely
coordinated with President Bush on the steps to be taken before Japan normalized
diplomatic relations with North Korea. President Bush also updated Koizumi on what
the United States knew about Pyongyang’s HEU program before the trip and expressed
support for Japanese-North Korean normalization. Here, Funabashi’s account shows
a more flexible Bush policy than that outlined in the Fuqua text. Also, Funabashi’s
account differs from that of Mike Chinoy in Meltdown and Jack Pritchard’s in Failed
Diplomacy. In the latter two books, the authors portray a George W. Bush who was less
supportive of Japan’s policy initiative.
There is also a riveting (at least for this reviewer) description of the way that
Kim Jong-il explained and apologized to Koizumi and the Japanese people for the
abductions. For North Korea to take responsibility for the abductions was an internal
precondition in the Japanese delegation’s negotiating position before bilateral relations
could be normalized. Here again, Funabsahi’s account differs from that of Mike Chinoy. Chinoy quotes a Columbia University professor, Gerald Curtiss, who says that the
main issue for Koizumi was resolving the nuclear issue with North Korea and then
“the abductee issue will not stand in the way of a rapid normalization between North
Korea and Japan.” Funabashi makes it clear that Diet politics and domestic politics in
Japan dictated that movement on the abductees must come before normalization could
be accepted in Japan. Whatever other books a student of North Korea and the Korean
Peninsula chooses to read, The Peninsula Question must be included.
Mike Chinoy, the author of Meltdown, is one of television’s most experienced
journalists. He is no stranger to operating in “denied environments,” having spent more
than a decade as CNN’s bureau chief in Beijing. He covered the Tiananmen Square
massacre in China and has also made a number of trips into Pyongyang. Chinoy culminated his career with CNN as its Asia bureau chief in Hong Kong. He is now the
Edgerton Fellow on Korean Security at the Pacific Council on International Policy in
Los Angeles.
Meltdown provides an account from more of an American perspective and
in that sense is a good parallel read to The Peninsula Question. Chinoy’s writing has
more of an “edge” to it than Funabashi’s. Chinoy manages to capture the sometimes
biting and personal internal dynamics between the hard-liners (or neoconservatives) in
the Bush Administration and the pragmatists there. He puts Vice President Cheney and
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the Office of the Vice President (OVP) at the center of the hard-line approach to North
Korea. Samantha Ravich, of the OVP, is described by Chinoy as the “ultraconservative” who those in the Administration favoring negotiations with Pyongyang called
“Samantha Rabid” behind her back. One gets some sense of the bitterness between factions in the Bush Administration and toward Clinton Administration policy from Jack
Pritchard’s account in Failed Diplomacy, but Meltdown is pretty graphic about it all.
At times, however, Chinoy is a little repetitive. How many times does the
reader need to see special envoy for talks with North Korea Joseph DeTrani (who
replaced Pritchard in the job) described as a “former CIA agent” or “former CIA operative?” This happens at every mention of DeTrani’s name in the book. Surely anyone
who has read Charlie Wilson’s War will be familiar with DeTrani’s history of work
with the Chinese intelligence services to arm Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets
after the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, despite these minor but critical points, Chinoy’s Meltdown is a
superb addition to any library on Korean Peninsula issues. He managed to interview
liberals and conservatives alike, plus a solid number of his extensive international
contacts, and provides a very good perspective. Read with Pritchard’s Failed Diplomacy, this book details the factional and policy fights in the Bush Administration and
between the Bush and Clinton people.
Bechtol’s Red Rogue closes with a more or less pessimistic outlook that forecasts continued stalling, cheating, and obfuscation by North Korea. He also suggests
that China and Russia will work to keep the Kim Jong-il regime alive. This is probably
correct. As the Obama Administration takes up the issue, some familiar players will
reemerge. At one point, some of the Clinton people seriously contemplated a military
strike on suspected North Korean nuclear facilities. Former Clinton Administration
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter was
fairly hard-line on North Korea and supported the CVID approach. Will he reappear?
We know that Robert (Bob) Einhorn, an excellent and patient nuclear nonproliferation negotiator from the Clinton Administration, may get a position under the
new administration. He differed in approach from some of the Bush people but was
pretty hard-line himself. Another pretty tough negotiator, Jim Steinberg, is supposed
to be joining the State Department on the Obama national security team. Also, we may
well see Jack Pritchard back with another administration. Certainly he will have some
influence.
It will be ironic that President Obama, considered by many to be a liberal, will
face a different landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The conservative Administration
of President Bush had to deal with the liberal Kim Dae-Jong in framing policy toward
Pyongyang. President Obama, at least as this article goes to print, will deal with Lee
Myung-bak and a more conservative National Assembly in Seoul. All of this guarantees that the books reviewed will help to navigate the terrain of the Korea Peninsula.
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